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Abstract - This paper documents a probabilistic risk 
assessment of existing and alternative power supply systems at a 
large telecommunications office. The analysis characterizes the 
increase in the reliability of power supply through the use of two 
alternative power configurations. Failures in the power systems 
supporting major telecommunications service nodes are a main 
contributor to significant telecommunications outages.  A logical 
approach to improving the robustness of telecommunication 
facilities is to increase the depth and breadth of technologies 
available to restore power during power outages. Distributed 
energy resources such as fuel cells and gas turbines could 
provide additional on-site electric power sources to provide 
backup power, if batteries and diesel generators fail.  The 
analysis is based on a hierarchical Bayesian approach and 
focuses on the failure probability associated with each of three 
possible facility configurations, along with assessment of the 
uncertainty or confidence level in the probability of failure.  A 
risk-based characterization of final best configuration is 
presented. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
Telecommunications has been identified by the Department 
of Homeland Security as a critical infrastructure for the 
United States. Failures in the power systems supporting major 
telecommunications service nodes are a main contributor to 
major telecommunications outages, as documented by 
analyses of Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
outage reports by the National Reliability Steering Committee 
(under auspices of the Alliance for Telecommunications 
Industry Solutions). There are two major issues that have 
increasing impact on the sensitivity of the power distribution 
to telecommunication facilities: deregulation of the power 
industry and changing weather patterns.    
There is no incentive for the power utilities to make their 
systems more robust to these disturbances; rather, the industry 
has moved to change the reliability-reporting requirements to 
avoid financial penalties [1].  As noted by Sandia researchers 
in 2000, telecommunication companies, emergency services, 
etc. – which are dependent on a reliable source of power – 
need to be prepared for increased uncertainty in the operation 
of the national electrical infrastructure [2]. 
One approach toward improving the robustness of the 
power systems supporting telecommunications offices is to 
improve the reliability of the necessary supply of power. 
Current best practices involve a combination of on-site 
battery backup (for short, intermittent power interruptions) 
and diesel generators (for longer-term interruptions). 
Occasionally, universal power system (UPS) technologies are 
also used for specific data communications equipment 
backup. 
A logical approach to improving reliability would be to 
increase the depth and breadth of technologies available to 
restore power in the face of power outages. Distributed 
energy resources such as photovoltaic (solar) cells, wind 
generators, fuel cells, and gas turbines could provide an 
additional on-site electric power source for backup power, if 
batteries and diesel generators fail. But does the diversity in 
power sources actually increase the reliability of offered 
power to the office equipment, or does the complexity of 
installing and managing the extended power system induce 
more potential faults and higher failure rates? 
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 The goal of this research was to perform probabilistic risk 
assessments (PRAs) on an existing power configuration for a 
large telecommunications center with diesel generator and 
battery backup, and for two alternative power configurations 
adding natural gas turbines as a primary power source. The 
product from the study was an analysis of probability of 
failure associated with each of the three facility 
configurations, along with an assessment of the uncertainty or 
confidence level in the failure probability estimate. 
 
II. OPERATIONAL SCENARIO 
The location of interest for this effort was assumed to be a 
remote switch facility with limited physical access via roads. 
The utility power at this location is particularly unreliable – in 
the most recent four-year period, there were 35 utility outages 
(compared with a national average of approximately three 
outages per year for 2001 and 2002).  
The telecommunication center consists of a main facility 
supported by two switch bays.  Power is supplied to the 
facility primarily through a traditional utility drop.  In the 
event that utility power is lost, at least two of the three on-
location 1.5MW diesel generators must function.  In addition 
to the two generators, the battery system must be available to 
provide minimal support for an additional 4 hours in the event 
that the generators fail. 
For this analysis, an (almost) worst-case scenario was 
assumed. This scenario represents a documented situation that 
will likely exist after a severe-weather event. If utility power 
is lost, restoration of power will not occur within a time 
period that will have a significant impact. Similarly, if a diesel 
generator or gas turbine fails, minor repair is possible, but 
replacement of the entire generator (or turbine) is not an 
option. The only available fuel for the generators is what is 
currently stored on-site (assumed to be 72 hours worth for 
each generator); fuel lost through consumption or 
contamination cannot be replaced within 4 hours.  The 4hour 
limit is used because the batteries are required to provide 
minimum support for the plants for an additional 4 hours, in 
the event that power is lost from the generators.  
Figure 1 depicts the time line of events for the Base Case 
scenario: utility power fails, generators start with some 
probability, fail with some likelihood, and run out of fuel after 
72 hours. Batteries provide backup emergency power for a 
maximum of 4 hours (or until they fail during operation).    
 
III. ANALYSIS APPROACH 
The standard methods and data used to estimate the 
reliability of power systems are documented in the IEEE 
Standard 493-1997 IEEE Recommended Practice for the 
Design of Reliable Industrial and Commercial Power Systems 
[3]. However, a traditional approach is not applied because of 
the sequential, time-dependent nature of how the system is 
operated. 
Figure 1 depicts a typical sequence of events where the x-
axis is a timeline.  Each event logically follows at the 
conclusion of the previous event.  For example, for the Base 
Case, the time that the utility is available TU is a random 
variable described by an exponential distribution conditioned 
on the rate of utility power failure:  f (T | λU ) = exp[−λU t ] . 
The rate at which the utility power fails, λU, is not known with 
certainty; therefore this parameter is characterized as a 
random variable: λ ~ g(λ |α,θ ) .  Because of the conditional 
structure of the distributions for T and λU Gibbs, sampling 
must be used when simulating the power availability.  The 
WinBugs computer software was used for all simulations 
conducted in this report [4]  
Similar to the utility reliability, values for diesel generator 
operation reliability, TG, and battery reliability, TB, are 
simulated. The values are then combined to get the time until 
system failure, Tbase=TU+TG+TB.  Figure 1 depicts the typical 
time line of events associated with what is referred to in the 
following discussion as the Base Case. 
The following sections address each of the elements of the 
various scenarios. The Base Case is a function of the 
availability of power from the utility, the backup diesel 
generators, and the batteries.  The additional alternatives 
explored include the addition of natural gas turbines from 
Capstone and Kawasaki as described in more detail below.  
 
IV. ANALYSIS ELEMENTS 
The following sub-analyses are based on actual data related 
to characteristics of the individual elements.   
 
A. Utility Reliability 
As suggested earlier, it is assumed that the length of time 
that a utility power is up/operating, TU, is an exponentially 
distributed random variable with parameter  λU: 
f (T | λU ) = exp[−λU t ] . The parameter  λU represents the 
number of utility interruptions per year.  However, the 
estimate ˆ λ = 8.75 represents a simple average rate at which 
events occurred during the four years; in reality, there will be 
a great deal of variation or uncertainty about the rate,  λU, at 
which events might occur each year. 
 
Figure 1. Base Case Time Line of Events.  The figure shows the event 
sequence that is analyzed for the Base Case, where the x-axis is time.  
   Fitting a distribution to utility interruption rates resulted in 
 λU being a gamma distributed random variable: 
f (λU |α,β) = 1βα Γ(α) λU
α−1 exp − λUβ
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥  with parameters 
α = 19.14  and β = 0.457.  The resulting probability density 
function (PDF), describing the uncertainty in the number of 
utility outages each year, is presented in Figure 2.   
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Figure 3. depicts the resulting PDF and cumulative 
distribution function (CDF) of the distribution for utility 
reliability.  
 
 
B. Generator Reliability 
Failure of a diesel generator is defined as a malfunction of 
the generator or associated support subsystems that prevent 
the generator from starting and running when a demand has 
occurred. Failures can occur in two modes:  
• Failure to start (FTS) – A failure of the generator to 
either manually or automatically start on a bus under-
voltage condition, reach rated voltage and speed, close 
the output breaker, or sequence safety-related 
electrical loads onto the respective safety-related bus. 
• Failure to run (FTR) – A failure of the generator to 
continue to supply power to its respective safety-
related electrical bus given the generator successfully 
started.  
Using IEEE Std 493 [3], an estimated mean failure rate for 
diesel generators is 0.0001 failure/hour with a mean time to 
repair of 3.9 hours.  However, the expected failure rate for 
diesel generators used in nuclear power plants is 
approximately 0.0223 failures/hour.  In addition, for diesel 
generators at nuclear power plants the Pr{failure to start} = 
0.0241 per demand [5,6]. 
 
Figure 2. PDF  (bars, left axis) and CDF (line, right axis) of the Number 
of Utility Outages per Year  
Using the NUREG/CR-5500 data and the Gold Book as 
starting points, the uncertainty in the generator failure rate can 
be characterized.   
 
 
Figure 4. PDF (bars, left axis) and CDF (line, right axis)  for Generator 
Reliability (TG) 
 
Figure 3. PDF (bars, left axis) and CDF (line, right axis) for Utility 
Reliability (TU) 
 
 
Figure 5. Battery Reliability Summary (TB) 
This can then be coupled with the failure-to-start likelihood 
and the probability of available fuel supply. Finally, 
considering that two of the three generators must be 
operational, a simulation was performed – the results are 
depicted in Figure 4.  The sharp increase at 72 hours is due to 
the limited source of on-site fuel. 
 
C. Battery Reliability 
Battery backup consists of a bank of valve-regulated lead-
acid (VRLA) batteries.  VRLA batteries are a well-
established technology used as a backup power source for 
short periods of time. The facility has two switch plants where 
Plant 1 has a 10,000 amp shunt and has 28 strings of C&D 
HD-1300; and Plant 2 has a 15,000 amp shunt and has 8 
strings of C&D HD-1300 and 8 strings of East Penn AVR95-
33. 
A reliability assessment for the batteries was performed in 
a manner similar to that accomplished for the utility and 
generator reliability assessments. The results are depicted in 
Figure 5.   
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 D. Base Case Summary 
Table 1 summarizes the results for the Base Case 
configuration; recall that this represents a summary of the 
reliability characteristics of the current configuration at the 
telecommunications facility under the operational scenario 
assumed.  Figure 6 depicts the results graphically. 
 
 
III. DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES 
The following sections discuss the analysis of two 
alternatives to traditional utility power.  These alternatives are 
based on the use of natural gas turbines to provide generation 
of on-site power at the telecommunications facility.  Two 
configurations of interest were a single Kawasaki turbine and 
an arrangement of four pallets, each with six Capstone natural 
gas microturbines.  Both of these configurations depend on a 
supply of natural gas; therefore, the reliable supply of the 
natural gas is critical.  Section A addresses the supply of 
natural gas, and Sections B and C document research into the 
two turbine configurations.  
The analysis of the operational scenario proposed involves 
relying on the turbine as the primary facility power source and 
the use of the Base Case configuration as the backup power 
supply.  This is depicted in Figure 7.  
 
 
A. Natural Gas Pipeline Reliability 
The Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), within the U. S. 
Department of Transportation, Pipeline and Hazardous 
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), has overall 
regulatory responsibility for hazardous liquid and gas 
pipelines under its jurisdiction in the United States.  Federal 
safety standards are described in the U.S. Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR), Title 49 Transportation, Parts 190 – 199. 
There are more than 2 million miles of pipelines that support 
the movement of hazardous liquids, natural gas, and propane.  
The two types of natural gas pipelines are transmission and 
distribution.  The focus of this effort involves the 1.86 million 
miles of pipeline involved with distribution of natural gas.  
There are a number of failure modes for pipelines, most of 
which are unique to the area where the pipeline is located  – 
including corrosion, external forces (such as excavation or 
natural forces), and material failure. Characterization of the 
probability of failure of a particular distribution line can be 
extremely complicated.  For example, failure due to corrosion 
is dependent on factors such as the type and condition of the 
pipe’s coating, the effectiveness of corrosion control 
equipment, and the soil conditions surrounding the pipe. 
Alternatively, the probability of pipeline damage as the result 
of third-party damage depends on, for example, the extent and 
type of excavation or agricultural activity along the pipeline 
right-of-way and the depth of cover over the pipeline.  
According to industry input, natural gas distribution system 
pipeline could be extended about 4 miles (6.437 km), 
utilizing a 4" (101.6 mm) diameter feeder line connected to 
an on-site turbine compressor station, with direct connection 
to the power systems.    
Historically, the dominant failure mode for natural gas 
distribution pipeline is a result of external factors involving 
third parties, e.g., excavation.  The rate at which these failures 
occur are a function of the buried depth, how well the pipeline 
is marked, the density of the population, and the land use of 
the area of interest.  The factors can be used to augment the 
basic failure rate established for pipes of a particular diameter 
[7].  
Contribution of external factors to the failure rate of the 
pipeline: λExt = λd KdcKwtK pd K pmd  where λd  is the basic 
failure rate for pipes of diameter d, and the correction factors 
 account for failure due to third-party 
activities: buried depth, wall thickness, population density, 
and prevention method.  Assuming a distribution pipe 
diameter of 102 mm, an estimate of the basic failure rate is 
Kdc ,Kwt ,K pd ,Kpm
λd = 0.218  failures/1,000 km-year (Table 2, [7]).  
It is assumed that, for the facility in question, the area is 
rural; Kpd = 0.81 and best protection method is employed 
and the length of pipe is 6.44 km.  Estimates of the failure 
rates are from [8] and [7].  
Specifically, the following assumptions are made in the 
analysis: 
 
Figure 6. PDF (bars, left axis) and CDF (line, right axis)  for Base Case  
TABLE I.  
BASE CASE RELIABILITY SUMMARY (TG) 
 
Figure 7. Time Line for DER Analyses 
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 • Kdc - worst case is to assume depth of cover is less 
than 0.91 m: Kdc = 2.54 ; best case is to assume that 
depth of cover is greater than 1.22 m: Kdc = 0.54 .   
• Kwt  - worst case is to presume that the wall 
thickness of pipe will be no more than the minimum 
of 4.8 mm: Kwt = 1.0 ; and best case assumes that the 
thickness is greater than 4.8 mm: Kwt = 0.2    
•  - the location of the telecommunication center 
appears to be rather remote (7 miles of dirt road).  
Assume that the area is rural (best case): 
; and the worst-case assumption is that 
the distribution pipe is laid through a densely 
populated area: . 
K pd
Kpd = 0.81
Kpd = 18.77
•  - worst- case situation implies that there are 
only marker posts to delineate the location of the 
distribution line: ; while for best- case, 
additional methods are used: . 
K pm
Kpm = 1.03
K pm = 0.91
Best/worst case (failures/year): 
λbest = λd KdcKwtK pd Kpmd
= (0.000218)(0.54)(0.2)(0.81)(6.44)(6.44)
= 0.000112
 
λworst = λd KdcKwtKpd K pmd
= (0.000218)(2.54)(1.0)(18.77)(1.03)(6.44)
= 0.0.06894
 
The probability of failure in one year is then assumed to be 
in the range: 
    
Fng = {1− exp[−0.000112] = 0.00012,
1− exp[−0.068984] = 0.06662}
The failure rate of pipeline is assumed to be a random 
variable, characterized by a lognormal distribution, with a 5% 
lower limit of 0.000112 and an upper 95% limit of 0.06894. 
Figure 8 depicts the final distribution for the time to failure of 
the natural gas pipeline. As with other elements in the system, 
the time to failure for the pipeline is assumed to be an 
exponentially distributed random variable: 
TNG ~ exp[−λNG t ], where λNG  represents the rate at which 
pipeline failures occur. 
 
 
B. Capstone Microturbine Analysis 
The Capstone microturbines were investigated as one 
possible alternative-power generation source. Emissions are 
low: approximately 2.3 parts per million on dry volume basis 
(ppmvd) NOx per generator for 75% loading, and about 2.0 
ppmvd NOx for 100% loading.  
The configuration of Capstone turbines consisted of four 
pallets of six turbines for a total of 24 turbines.  Each turbine 
is capable of 60 kW of output; and, for efficiency purposes, 
the turbines are exercised at 90% of their capacity.  The total 
available power is then 1.296 MW.  The current maximum 
demand is approximately 1.1 MW, leaving an excess capacity 
of 196 kW.  At the peak level of loading, only 21 of the 24 
Capstone turbines are needed to supply power for the facility. 
The facility can be supported at a minimum level, if even if 
seven of the microturbines were unavailable. 
According to Capstone engineers, these turbines are 
currently in-place at a variety of locations and have attained 
95% availability. The overall design life is 40,000 hours, and 
Capstone engineers have estimated the mean time to failure 
for an individual microturbine to be 8,000 hours and noted  – 
that they expect this to double over during the next few years.  
Scheduled maintenance activities are recommended at 8,000 
and 20,000 hours.   The 8,000-hour maintenance is to change 
air and some other filters, and for replacing the igniter.  The 
downtime for this service is 3 hours.  The 20,000- hour 
service includes the 8,000- hour actions, plus changing of fuel 
injectors.  The downtime for this service is 12 hours. 
To characterize the uncertainty in the failure rate for a 
single Capstone microturbine, it was assumed that there was a 
20% chance that the failure rate would be greater than 
λ = 1/8000.  Further, it was assumed that there was a 90% 
probability that the failure rate would be less 
than λ = 1/16000.  Failure probability of the Capstone 
microturbine is assumed to be an exponentially distributed 
random variable: TC1 ~ exp[−λC1t ], where λC1 represents the 
rate at which turbine failures occur.   
 
Figure 8. PDF (bars, left axis) and CDF (line, right axis) for Natural 
Gas Time to Failure (TNG) 
 
Figure 9. PDF (bars, left axis) and CDF (line, right axis) for alternative 
configuration w/Capstone Configuration 
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 Using this information and the operational configuration of 
the microturbine array, a cumulative distribution function was 
constructed assuming the Capstone microturbine 
configuration above.  Note that these results are sensitive to 
the operation and maintenance philosophy adopted; it is 
possible that more reliable configurations could have been 
found with proper application of optimization algorithms.  
 
C. Kawasaki Turbine Analysis 
A second power-system configuration involved the use of a 
single Kawasaki natural gas turbine.  A typical turbine for this 
application is the GPB 15X 1.5 MW turbine.  With the 
addition of a combustion/catalyst system, the emissions of the 
Kawasaki turbine are low: approximately 3 ppmvd NOx (15% 
O2) over a broad range of power. 
Kawasaki provided a mean time to failure (MTTF) = 
200,974 hours; and a mean time to repair (MTTR) = 3.1 
hours; based on a sample of 150 installed units. To 
characterize the uncertainty in the failure rate for a Kawasaki 
turbine, it is assumed that there was a 10% chance that the 
failure rate would be greater than λK = 1 / 200974 .  This 
number is exceptionally high, and to be conservative it is 
assumed that the median failure rate was twice the value 
reported by Kawasaki. This implies that there is a 50% 
chance that the failure rate might be as high as 2 × λK  
As with the Capstone microturbine, the failure rate is 
assumed to be a random variable characterized with a 
lognormal distribution, and this distribution is fully 
characterized by the two failure rates assumed above.  Finally, 
the time to failure for a single Kawasaki turbine is assumed to 
be an exponentially distributed random variable: 
TK ~ exp[−λK t ], where λK  represents the rate at which 
turbine failures occur.    
Figure 10 depicts the time to failure of the facility, given 
the installation of a single Kawasaki natural gas turbine.  
 
 
VI. RESULTS  
Figure 11 summarizes the results of the three analyses: 
Base Case, alternative configurations that included the 
Capstone microturbine array, and the single Kawasaki 
turbine.  The overlay provides the capability to make a risk-
based decision of the relative reliability benefits of the three 
alternatives through a comparison of the credibility limits for 
each alternative.  
Since there is no overlap between the credibility limits, a 
comparison is relatively straightforward.  Consider a 
comparison between the reliability of the current power 
supply (i.e. Base Case) and the array configuration of 
Capstone microturbines investigated.  There is a 90% chance 
that the utility power will fail before 2,529 hours, while there 
is a 90% chance that the Capstone array will provide power 
for at least 2,698 hours.   
Finally, consider that there is a 90% probability that the 
Capstone array will fail to provide power for less than 
approximately 8,706 hours, while there is a 90% probability 
that the single Kawasaki turbine will provide power for at 
least 9,048 hours.   
A significant, but not decisive, element in the lower 
reliability estimate for the Capstone was the configuration and 
operational plan investigated.  Other configurations could 
have quite different reliability characteristics and warrant 
further investigation.  However, installation issues associated 
with the Capstone, e.g. special enclosure, could be a factor in 
the final decision.  
 
Figure 10. PDF (bars, left axis) and CDF (line, right axis) for the 
alternative power system configuration with a Kawaski Turbine. 
Not considered in the analysis for either the Kawasaki or 
Capstone configurations is the probability that the turbines 
will fail to start.  Just as with the diesel generators, the 
Capstone microturbines can be characterized by a probability 
to start from a cold-standby.  This is less of a consideration 
for the Kawasaki since this turbine would be operating 24/7.  
Also not considered in the analyses is consideration of the 
differences in the control systems for the two turbines.   
In conclusion, probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) on 
alternative-power configurations have been shown to be an 
informative approach to evaluating risk mitigation for power 
disruption.  Methodologies have been developed and applied 
to a case study for a large telecom site.  For the case-study 
configurations and operating assumptions, a PRA indicates 
that significant increased reliability can be achieved – 
including likelihood of natural gas delivery failure – by 
incorporating a natural gas turbine as primary power with 
utility grid, diesel, and batteries as the backup systems.   
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Figure 11. Comparison CDFs for the three system configurations with 10%, median, and 90% probability points delineated for 
comparison.  
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